An Assessment of Space Shuttle Flight Software Development Processes (1993) / Chapter Skim
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6. Organizational Issues
6. Organizational Issues
Pages 77-86
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From page 77... ...
· The S&MQ Office at NASA headquarters and SR&QA offices at the centers are not as effective as Hey should, or could, be. Because of inadequate resources and lack of au~onty, they have been unable to produce NASA-wide standards for software IV&V, reliability, quality assurance, or safety In a tamely fashion.
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From page 78... ...
However, as evidenced by its numerous additional questions about venous organizations and their responsibilities, the Committee does not feel that the complete process is adequately documented. In fact, basM on discussions win NASA and contractor personnel, and based on the Committee's own experience with Me Shuttle program, the Committee believes that there is a great deal of information about the day-to-day execution of the Shuttle flight software process Mat is not contained in any existing document but is instead passed on from person to person in the form of accumulated knowledge and on-thejob training.
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From page 79... ...
ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES The Committee submit numerous questions to NASA in an attempt to cianfy the relationships among headquarters S&MQ, the program offices at the centers, the center S&MQ offices, and Be contractors. The Committee also spent a great deal of time and effort with the documentation Hat purports to describe the process, toying to understand the lines of authority and responsibility within what NASA refers to as the piglet software community.
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From page 80... ...
Instead, the Shuttle program itself is responsible for implementing software oversight functions, while Me S&MQ Office at headquarters and the SR&QA offices at the centers have been relegated to an advisory role. The Committee has also found, Trough its discussions with venous NASA personnel, that the headquarters S&MQ Office and the SR&QA Office at ISC do not have the manpower needed to fully monitor the process.
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From page 81... ...
The Committee believes Be spent of this recommendation has not been followed. This is evidenced by the fact that Me S&MQ and SR&QA offices lack the au~oricy or He resources needed to approve the manner of oversight implemented by the Shuttle program and to fully monitor their effectiveness.
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From page 82... ...
However, specific task accountability and safety goals cannot be reached unless there are specific organizations, and thus specific people, within the flight software community who are given responsibility for performing each function. The Committee believes that failure to assign responsibility for the performance of a function to a specific organization opens the process up to interpretation and increases the potential Hat important functions will be forgotten or ignored because responsibility for them was left to the community.
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From page 83... ...
3 o V, of ,_ ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES e m C)
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From page 84... ...
POLICIES, GUIDELINES, AND ENFORCEMENT The fact Cat this and ocher studies have been necessary indicates that the benefits of IV&V, software reliability, software quality assurance, and software safety have not been fully impressed upon He Shuttle program management. This is partially a failure of the program management to realize these benefits, but it is also a failure by NASA headquarters to provide He program management with the appropriate cost-versus-bene6t information and the appropriate policies and guidelines for implementation of these oversight functions.
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From page 85... ...
Finding #16: A primary reason for the lack of established policies and guidelines is the lack of sufficient resources, manpower, and expertise devoted to developing them. Based on discussion with the S&MQ personnel at NASA headquarters and the SR&QA offices at the centers, and also based on the Commiaee's observations of the time required to develop and obtain approval for appropriate policies and guidelines, the Committee believes that
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From page 86... ...
However, it is He belief of this Committee that if a commitment were made by NASA headquarters and Shuttle program management to adequately support He oversight functions with He funds and personnel needed, and if a consistent NASA-wide policy were prepared, considerable benefits could be realized that would justify any additional cost. Furthermore, the Committee believes that an effective case could be made to Congress and to the administration, based on the long-term savings realized by avoiding expensive overruns and failures, that would help lessen the pressure to reduce costs.
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