Scientific Communication and National Security (1982) / Chapter Skim
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1 Current Knowledge About Unwanted Technology Transfer and Its Military Significance
1 Current Knowledge About Unwanted Technology Transfer and Its Military Significance
Pages 13-21
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From page 13... ...
of the entire Panel by key spokesmen for the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. intelligence community's interagency Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee.
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From page 14... ...
Isolated occurrences of significant technology losses are fairly well documented, but none of these documented cases has involved open scientific communication. Evidence on the ability of the Soviet military to absorb Western technology is incomplete, while evidence on the military significance of identified transfers is largely fragmentary.
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From page 15... ...
m e transfer mechanism for such detailed information involves neither documents nor equipment, but more typically is the "apprenticing" experience that takes place, among other means, through long-term scientific exchanges that involve actual participation in ongoing research. This last type of scientific communication is a leading concern of the U.S.
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From page 16... ...
Soviet scientists and students who participate in formal international exchange programs have been linked to the intelligence effort. 2 One should assume that almost all Soviet technical visitors to the United States are prebriefed about specific acquisition needs, and it is certain that Soviet visitors to other countries are required to report on their foreign experiences.
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From page 17... ...
research community is an increased effort focusing on newly emerging technologies, particularly those that evolve directly from scientific research. EVI DENCE OF THE EXTENT OF UNWANTED TRANSFER The Overall Problem Statements by intelligence community officials3 indicate that about 70 percent of the militarily significant technology acquired by the Soviet Union has been acquired through Soviet and East European intelligence organizations, using both overt and covert methods.
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From page 18... ...
EVIDENCE OF THE SOVIET ABSORPTION CAPACITY One should not necessarily equate foreign acquisition of sensitive technology with improvement of foreign military capabilities. Such improvements can occur only after an intermediate step is passed, namely, the successful exploitation of the acquired information.
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From page 19... ...
m e intelligence community has provided examples of Soviet acquisition of important technology (see Table 3~. m e Panel has no reason to doubt government assertions that such acquisitions from the West have permitted the Soviet military to develop countermeasures to Western weapons, improve Soviet weapon performance, avoid hundreds of millions of dollars In R&D costs, and modernize critical sectors of Soviet military production.
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From page 20... ...
Acquisitions of marine and other navigation receivers, advanced inertial-guidance components, including miniature and laser gyros; acquisitions of missile guidance subsystems; acquisitions of precision machinery for ball-bearing production for missile and other applications; acquisition of missile test range instrumentation systems and documentation and precision cinetheodolites for collecting data critical to postflight ballistic missile analysis. Purchases and acquisitions of Western titanium alloys, welding equipment, and furnaces for producing titanium plate of large size applicable to submarine construction.
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From page 21... ...
, an informal international organizaion for the coordination of national export controls; others have to do with the difficulties in preventing Soviet collection of information from nonaligned nations; and still others are due to limited resources and divided organizational responsibility. For these reasons the Panel does not believe that a useful forecast can be made at present concerning the future proportion of leakage to the Soviet bloc through scientific communication.
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