Scientific Communication and National Security (1982) / Chapter Skim
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5 Improving the Current System
5 Improving the Current System
Pages 52-64
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From page 52... ...
Four agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, share the job of gathering intelligence on the nature, extent, and significance of unwanted transfers. Major regulatory authority is split among three separate offices (the Department of Commerce's EAR administrators, the Department of State s ITAR administrators, and State's visa-processing office)
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From page 53... ...
Export Controls and Domestically Available Information American scientists have broad, constitutionally based rights to disseminate information within the United States free from government control, unless the information is classified or they have agreed in advance to contractual provisions limiting disclosure. And, as a practical matter, information that is available domestically is also available abroad.
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From page 54... ...
Militarily Critical Technologies List The Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) was originally seen as a way to help shift the emphasis in export controls away from products toward the control of know-how, as had been recommended by the Bucy report in 1976.
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From page 55... ...
~ The Panel is concerned about the tendency to expand the MCTL, exacerbating the problems of understanding and applying it. For example, among the critical technologies listed in the most recent draft of the MCTL are techniques for volume production of microwave tubes, techniques for fabrication of multigap solar cells, and rare earth magnet materials such as samarium cobalt.
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From page 56... ...
m e intelligence agencies do not have enough personnel who are able to judge the status of American technical capabilities in specified fields in comparison with those of Soviet bloc nations. Lacking such net assessments, decision makers are sometimes left with no reliable way to evaluate the meaning of a particular technological loss or the value of proposed exchange programs.
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From page 57... ...
leakage problem, as well as the costs of its control efforts. Better empirical bases for decision making will help the government set program priorities and understand how the benefits to be expected of technology transfer controls are related to their private and governmental costs.
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From page 58... ...
Examples of such countries today include Iran and Libya, but it must be stressed that the list is difficult to compile objectively and is continually changing. A serious concern is that technology transferred to m ird World countries will permit them to develop modern weapons sooner and at lower cost than would otherwise be the case.
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From page 59... ...
The Panel recommends that the intelligence and university communities establish an ongoing effort to raise awareness in the scientific community regarding the problems and costs of technological loss, and in the intelligence community regarding the problems and costs of applying restrictions on academic campuses. The Panel recommends the establishment of an academic advisory group to COMEX that would facilitate more effective communication between the universities and the appropriate federal agencies regarding scientific exchanges.
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From page 60... ...
Government-Science Relations Some of the disagreement within the United States over the need for more rigorous controls on scientific communication arises from insufficient mutual understanding about the motives, methods of operation, and concerns of the two communities involved. Many people within the U.S.
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From page 61... ...
Current university policies may permit a short delay in the open publication of such research results in order to conduct patent reviews, but generally do not otherwise allow restrictions on access or communication. However, if more severe proprietary restrictions evolve, it must be recognized that they could have the same adverse effects as the national security restrictions discussed in this report.
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From page 62... ...
If scientists in academia and elsewhere perceive activities that threaten national security, it is appropriate that they voluntarily inform government officials. While proposals for particular exchange visits are reviewed with respect to possible technology losses, the design and operation of the exchange programs themselves have been influenced far more by the foreign policy objective.
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From page 63... ...
bilateral agreements. certain fields covered by the bilaterals -- for example, plasma physics, condensed matter physics, and fundamental properties of matter -- are areas of considerable Soviet strength and provide useful scientific contributions to American research, and can provide insight into Soviet activities.
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From page 64... ...
review procedures on the receiving side be enhanced to ensure that only bona fide scholars are sent on the exchanges; (c) all militarily sensitive areas be excluded from the exchanges by formal agreement; and (d)
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