Scientific Communication and National Security (1982) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix A: Memorandum from the Intelligence Subpanel to the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security
Appendix A: Memorandum from the Intelligence Subpanel to the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security
Pages 91-96
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From page 91... ...
Phillips, E Staats The full Panel is charged to examine the question "What is the effect on national security of technology transfer to adversary nations by means of open scientific communications, either through scientific literature or by person-to-person communications.
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From page 92... ...
Since the mid-1950s, COMEX has provided such information, analysis, and advice to the Department of State and other government agencies regarding technology transfer and other implications of the proposed programs of foreign Communist students and other visitors. The fact that few demonstrable losses of direct military significance from U.S.
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From page 93... ...
The Soviets presumably also make full use of access to advanced technologies provided by various exchange arrangements with Western European countries and with Japan. A small percent of the several thousand Soviets entering the United States annually under some sort of exchange arrangement are known to have some intelligence affiliation.
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From page 94... ...
foreign technology collection effort into military application. The subpanel is skeptical that the organized Soviet effort involving tens of thousands of people charged with digesting the vast volume of open literature is an effective means to expedite technology transfer.
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From page 95... ...
Of those formally reviewed, about one-third are judged to pose significant technology transfer problems, and perhaps one-half are judged to offer "some" concerns. However, most often suggestions are offered by the government merely to modify the proposed program or itinerary to lessen the technology transfer concerns, and the exchanges proceed.
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From page 96... ...
research community are at times totally insensitive to national security issues and uncooperative with representatives of U.S. intelligence agencies.
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