Scientific Communication and National Security (1982) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix B: The Historical Context of National Security Concerns About Science and Technology
Appendix B: The Historical Context of National Security Concerns About Science and Technology
Pages 97-109
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From page 97... ...
When the war ended, a problem arose with respect to the declassification and release of scientific and industrial data obtained in Germany and Japan by allied forces. President Truman decided that these spoils of war should be released promptly, but that in doing so close attention should be paid to national security, given growing Soviet belligerence.
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From page 98... ...
In 1950 President Truman issued an executive order that contained a vaguely defined standard for protecting national security as the rationale for classifying secret documents. mis justification on the grounds of a need to protect national security has continued to the present day, although the definition of national security has been modified several times.
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From page 99... ...
. AS a result, Congress placed increasing pressure on both NSF and NIH to adopt restrictive policies, particularly in the form of required loyalty oaths for those receiving grants.
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From page 100... ...
In addition approximately 3,300 secrecy orders were renewed in FY 1979.~ The second secrecy-related effort was an executive order issued by President Eisenhower on the classification of secret documents. Like subsequent directives issued by Presidents Nixon, Carter, and Reagan, the Eisenhower order was intended to adjust the classification system to the needs of the current administration.
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From page 101... ...
As a result, the Export Administration Act of 1969 openly encouraged trade with all nations, including communist countries e me result was a substantial increase in U.S.-Soviet trade, much of it involving dual-use technology, such as computer hardware and ballbearing grinder machinery. GROWING CONCERN ABOUT TECHNOLOGY LOSS By the mid-1970s, however, some disturbing new trends had begun to emerge, both with respect to the configuration of U.S.
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From page 102... ...
intelligence community was poorly equipped to make informed judgments about the potential costs and benefits of granting visas to scientific visitors from the Soviet Union and other East European counties, many of whom were known to have been tasked to acquire scientific and technological information. Accordingly, in 1981 the Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC)
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From page 103... ...
A classified document of many hundreds of pages, the MCTL was developed by the Department of Defense with input from other line agencies and is intended to serve as a guide for modification of the EAR Commodity Control List as well as the lists maintained under the COCOM agreements. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMUNICATION IN THE POSTDETENTE ERA By the last year of the Carter administration the East-West political climate had deteriorated substantially because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the resulting American grain and technology embargoes, and the internal exile of Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov.
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From page 104... ...
m e Bennett task force also took up directly the question of applying export controls to academic activities and the effectiveness of this mechanism in limiting the loss of sensitive information. Another example of an attempt to reconcile the interests of the universities and the federal government came about as a result of concern expressed by the National Security Agency that the publication of certain information on new encryption methodologies in the field of cryptography might violate the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, since cryptography is classified as a munition (see Appendix E)
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From page 105... ...
Similar conflicts between the government and the scientific com munity occurred later in 1981. The Department of Defense released a report, Soviet Military Power, which was highly critical of the technology transfer occurring as a result of scientific exchange programs, international conferences and symposia, unclassified research reports, and publication of'articles in scientific journals.
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From page 106... ...
bilateral scientific exchange programs and the nonrenewal of others. Interacademy scientific exchanges between the NAS and the ASUSSR have also been curtailed due to the displeasure of U.S.
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From page 107... ...
107 deliberations. Many researchers attending the 26th annual international technical symposium of the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers, held in San Diego, California, August 23-27, 1982, were informed with less than ten days, notice that the public presentation of their papers was being blocked by the Department of Defense because of national security considerations and the presence of Soviet scientists and other foreign nationals.
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From page 108... ...
Target Countries COCOM controls apply to the U.S.S.R., the PRC, Eastern Europe except Yugoslavia, and Asian Communist countries. Cuba is not subject to COCOM controls.
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From page 109... ...
list and those of some of the other members, a commonly advanced rationale for keeping the COCOM lists secret is that publication could show the Soviet Union where to focus its R&D efforts. The three COCOM lists are the following: (1)
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