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Developing Norms for the Provision of Biological Laboratories in Low-Resource Contexts Proceedings of a Workshop (2019) / Chapter Skim
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5 KEY FACTORS FOR BUILDING AND SUSTAINABLY OPERATING HIGH-CONTAINMENT LABS IN LOW-RESOURCE CONTEXTS: AN OVERVIEW
Pages 43-50

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From page 43...
... She began with a list of desirable factors, all of which were mentioned during previous presentations or discussions:  Appropriate infrastructural components and adequate budgets and supply chain for power, water, equipment, reagents, labor, and maintenance services;  Management and administrative controls and culture;  Mechanisms to counter safety and security threats;  Regulatory framework, standards, and enforcement mechanisms;  Effective regular inspections;  Affiliation with biosafety and biosecurity organizations, curricula, and training to ensure professional competency; and  Multidisciplinary design and execution.
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From page 44...
... Nonproliferation (biosecurity) : Although there is a legitimate need for biocontainment facilities worldwide, the inherent dual-use potential of these facilities and related equipment, as well as the pathogens they contain and the skills developed through hands-on work, merit scrutiny in a world where terrorism and the proliferation of weapons-relevant materials, technologies, and expertise pose genuine threats.
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From page 45...
... Who is committed to the project, and are incountry national government officials committed? " If the answer to the last question is "no," can funders help to motivate them to commit to the project?
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From page 46...
... Infrastructure includes not only water supply and quality, power, waste treatment (including incinerators) , and transportation resources, but also telecommunications and internet connectivity.
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From page 47...
... governance workshop identified training on biosecurity issues as one answer. Another participant expressed more concern about insider threats, which are not addressed in many donation agreements.
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From page 48...
... A regional laboratory working with Ebola virus must worry about biosecurity. In comparison, a field laboratory dealing with rat urine contaminated by Lassa fever in an area where 10 percent of the rats carry the disease will not worry about biosecurity, although biosafety is a concern.
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From page 49...
... Canadian Custom Package model: New or repurposed modular units; two have been created in Nigeria and Sierra Leone; they provide safety with reduced complexity and are peer designed using core lab specifications plus or minus specific functions. Japanese model: Upgrade of existing high-containment laboratories (not new construction)
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From page 50...
... Breakout Group 2 also produced a list of "Donor Operational Risk Analysis Factors:"  Human resources: staff, training and education  Ownership/buy in  Collaboration and how well a country works with others  Utilities  Operations  Facilities  Finance and financial history  Monitoring  Regulatory framework  Security The importance of training and education received a lot of attention from both groups. One participant suggested that a donor agreement should require a training program that continuously serves the needs of a laboratory and its host country.
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Key Terms

  • recipient countries
  • participant mentioned
  • national government
  • waste treatment
  • participant noted

  • laboratory personnel
  • recipient country
  • participant suggested
  • nancy connell
  • transportation network

  • policy considerations
  • funding organizations
  • animal health
  • regional biosafety
  • insider threats

  • biological laboratories
  • physical security
  • regulatory framework
  • low priority
  • including incinerators

  • third participant
  • foreign policy
  • laboratory policy
  • containment laboratory
  • biological risk

  • participant commented
  • country national
  • participant expressed
  • national governments
  • includes laboratory


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