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Chapter 4: Reactor Options
Pages 116-213

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From page 116...
... fuel fabrication, and (d) licensing and public acceptance issues; (3)
From page 117...
... Although plutonium recovered from LWR fuel was used in these tests, the results are generally applicable to MOX made from WPu.~ In 1963 Belgium used a partial loading of MOX fuel in its BR-3 pressurized-water reactor (PWR)
From page 118...
... Even a small subset of U.S. commercial LWRs would suffice to absorb the nominal 50 tons of excess WPu in this way at the WPu-MOX fuel fabrication rates likely to be attainable.
From page 119...
... Also, the reactivity of MOX fuel tends to change more rapidly during an irradiation cycle than that of uranium fuel. There is greater spatial self-shielding of neutron flux in fuel assemblies composed of MOX fuel rods.
From page 120...
... could use WPu MOX in 100 percent of their reactor cores with little if any modification.3 Existing margin in the control capabilities of these reactors would, it is reported, allow them to operate within existing safety envelopes with 100-percent MOX cores. In a number of the existing-reactor cases, however, the maximum safe enrichment of plutonium in the fuel would be lower than it would be in new reactors designed specifically for plutonium use, potentially increasing total fuel fabrication costs and the time required to carry out the plutonium disposition mission.
From page 121...
... LWRs could be adapted for fullMOX cores. Because of the considerable worldwide experience with MOX fueling in LWRs, the panel judges the technical uncertainty of the LWR MOX option using either one-third or full-MOX cores-to be low (by comparison to other reactor options for use of plutonium fuels)
From page 122...
... As described in detail in Chapter 6, moreover, use of such high enrichments reduces the net cost of the operation by reducing the number of kilograms of MOX fuel that need to be produced and increasing the energy value of each kilogram of that fuel. The use of such high plutonium loadings, however, does create some technical issues, similar in some respects to those involved in moving from one-third to full-MOX cores.
From page 123...
... Fuel Fabrication Providing adequate plutonium processing and MOX fuel fabrication capability would be an important pacing factor for processing excess WPu in U.S.
From page 124...
... Alternatively, a new plutonium fuel fabrication facility could be built. Estimates provided to the panel (which appear to be optimistic)
From page 125...
... WNP-2, complete and operating, is not a System-80, but may also be capable of handling a full core of MOX fuel without major modifications. It has the advantages of being complete, licensed, and located on the federal government's Hanford site, where the FMEF fuel fabrication facility is also located.
From page 126...
... for the plutonium disposition mission. (For a discussion of the costs involved, see Chapter 6.)
From page 127...
... 7 By some estimates, more than a dozen reactors in the United States may be shut down well short of their design lives because the utilities that own them have other, more economical generation alternatives available. These reactors would be prime candidates for acquisition by the government for the plutonium disposition mission.
From page 128...
... Public approval in the areas near the relevant facilities will also be a critical factor. Problems of public approval and licensing could be lessened somewhat if both the fuel fabrication facilities and the reactors handling MOX fuels were on federal sites.
From page 129...
... Once the plutonium is in the form of bulk oxide, rather than individually packaged pits, precise accounting to detect any diversion will become considerably more difficult. This will be a particular problem at the fuel fabrication facility, where the accounting system will need to have the capability for timely detection of diversion or theft of even a very small percentage of the facility's throughput.
From page 130...
... If the reactors used for this purpose would have operated with LEU in any case, the total amount of spent fuel to be disposed of in a geologic repository would not be increased as a result of plutonium disposition; even if reactors were operated specifically for plutonium disposition, the total amount of added spent fuel would be a small fraction of the planned capacity of the first U.S. repository.
From page 131...
... policy, which has been not to pursue a plutonium fuel cycle, in part because of proliferation concerns. Such a perceived shift could have an impact on decisions on civil plutonium policies in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere.
From page 132...
... DOE-sponsored analyses, while considering reprocessing for other reactor types such as liquid-metal reactors, have considered only once-through MOX fueling for LWRs for the plutonium disposition mission. LWRs, however, could be used in a reprocessing and recycle mode as an elimination optionthough using the traditional PUREX (plutonium and uranium recovery by extraction)
From page 133...
... would have to be added, to allow continued recycling for further destruction of the plutonium. The portion of the reactor devoted to MOX fuel would shrink with each irradiation cycle, until finally the desired degree of plutonium burnup was obtained.
From page 134...
... It is possible that some of the reprocessing approaches that have been suggested for other reactor types, which do not fully separate the plutonium, could be adapted to Lam fueling, but such approaches would have to be developed. The net rate of plutonium destruction would be increased if additional plutonium was not being produced by absorption of neutrons in the uranium in the MOX fuel.
From page 135...
... fuels would substantially reduce the amount of new plutonium produced for each unit of WPu burned or energy generated. For example, if the power level is to be kept constant, doubling the plutonium concentration (for example, from 3.5 to 7 percent of heavy metal atoms in MOX fuel for an LWR)
From page 136...
... Counting only current market prices for reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication (not the substantial costs of development and licensing, building a new reprocessing facility if such were done in the United States, or the increased reprocessing and fabrication costs likely to be associated with multiple recycle material) , "effective elimination" with LWRs using MOX would cost some $2.3 billion more than the once-through spent fuel option with similar reactors.
From page 137...
... The capability of VVER-1000s to process WPu in the form of MOX fuel is likely to be similar to that of current-generation U.S.
From page 138...
... 2) , for example, indicate that while "for a long time in Russia, much longer than in other countries, plutonium was meant to be used solely in fast breeder reactors," now "work is underway to study the fabrication technology of experimental subassemblies with MOX fuel for the VVER-1000," and a critical assembly to test such fuels is being built at Obninsk.
From page 139...
... The panel does not believe that the RBMKs should be considered for the plutonium disposition mission.
From page 140...
... Fuel Fabrication As in the United States, the time at which disposition of excess WPu could begin would be paced by the availability of a MOX fuel fabrication facility. While Russia has laboratory-scale MOX fabrication facilities, no production facility with the required capabilities is currently operational.
From page 141...
... are committed to a closed fuel cycle, including plutonium fuels, emphasizing fast-breeder reactors. MINATOM wishes to save the excess WPu for eventual use as startup fuel for future breeder reactors.
From page 142...
... It is clear, however, that Russia has an overcapacity of lowcost LEU available for fueling its thermal reactors, which it is trying to market in the West to earn hard currency. It is also clear that significant up-front capital would be required to provide requisite plutonium fuel fabrication capability and to modify reactors to handle full-MOX cores.
From page 143...
... The Elimination Option To implement the elimination option in the former Soviet Union would require the utilization of reprocessing facilities as well as the power-reactor and MOX fuel fabrication facilities discussed above.
From page 144...
... Presumably, these facilities could be utilized, as in the case of similar facilities in the United States, to reprocess MOX Mel assemblies in the elimination option. The "head-ends" of the military reprocessing facilities would have to be modified to handle the MOX fuel from the power reactors.
From page 145...
... , the CANDU vendor, reports more than 25 years of experience with experimental irradiation testing of MOX fuels, with plutonium loadings between 0.5 and 3.0 percent. An experimental MOX fabrication facility was installed at Chalk River in 1975, and operated until placed on standby in 1987; this facility is now being reopened, and a resumption of MOX fabrication is expected in late 1995.
From page 146...
... While the CANDU reactor design is in principle even more easily adaptable to full-core MOX operation than most LWRs, at the same time the technical uncertainties concerning MOX use in CANDUs must be considered somewhat larger than in the LWR case, given the lack of MOX operating experience in CANDU reactors. There are also considerable uncertainties concerning the economics of this option, as no one has ever produced CANDU MOX fuel before.
From page 147...
... First, CANDU reactors offer greater flexibility for maintaining controlabsorber worth with plutonium fuels. In a calandria-type heavy-water reactor most of the reactor-core volume is occupied by the relatively cool, low-pressure, heavy-water moderator.
From page 148...
... Analysis by the vendor shows in the event of a large-break LOCA, power output in a uranium-fueled reactor could increase to over four times its nominal value, but would not increase at all in the MOX fueled system (AECL 1994, p.
From page 149...
... For reactors fueled with U-235 in U-238, the conversion ratio of the CANDU is 0.75, compared with about 0.6 for a LWR or an HTGR. High neutron economy would be important for plutonium-burning fuel cycles that sought high burnup during an irradiation cycle using fertile-free plutonium fuels.
From page 150...
... For fuel containing more plutonium, still more intensive safeguarding would be needed. Both CANDU reactors and the fresh MOX fuel in store at either an LWR or a CANDU, however, require continuous safeguarding in any case.
From page 151...
... operates at a typical discharge burnup of 8,300 MWd/MTHM. The first option for plutonium disposition, using fuel elements similar to those now used with natural uranium, would have an average plutonium loading of 1.5 percent.
From page 152...
... The primary potential advantage of this latter approach is not speeding the process, but drastically reducing the number of MOX fuel bundles that would have to be fabricated, thereby potentially reducing the cost of the operation. The disadvantage of this approach is that CANFLEX fuel is not yet licensed, and a more substantial delay before CANFLEX MOX fuel could be produced would be expected.
From page 153...
... On the other hand, the subsidy required might also be more than in the LWR case, as the amount of natural uranium CANDU fuel each kilogram of MOX would substitute for whose cost would be subtracted from the MOX cost in calculating the subsidy required would be more than $1,000 cheaper than the LEU LWR fuel a kilogram of MOX could substitute for.24 The vendor estimates, probably optimistically, that the U.S. FMEF fuel fabrication facility could be modified for an overnight cost of $1 18 million, and produce MOX with annual operating costs of about $64 million per year for the reference MOX fuel and 20 percent more for the CANFLEX fuel option.
From page 154...
... The plutonium processing rate per reactor would therefore be nearly doubled. By the same token, however, twice as much fuel fabrication capability would be required, potentially incurring significant additional capital cost.
From page 155...
... Plutonium storage and transport arrangements, fuel fabrication capabilities, and reactors licensed to handle plutonium for this task already exist or are planned.26 Technical feasibility is amply demonstrated. One possibility for long-tenn disposition of excess WPu, therefore, is to substitute this weapons material for the civilian plutonium.27 Pits would be processed to plutonium oxide in their country of origin and the resulting oxide shipped to Europe or Japan for fabrication and use.28 In particular, such an approach would enable disposition of Russian plutonium in the near term while 26 As of 1993, eight EWRs in France, seven in Germany, and two in Switzerland are using MOX fuel, and more are licensed to do so; Belgium and Japan plan to begin loading MOX fuel in commercial reactors later in the decade.
From page 156...
... or Russian WPu (or both) into MOX fuel, if a political arrangement allowing it to be opened for this purpose could be reached.
From page 157...
... are consumed. Reprocessing plants would be kept in cold standby until then.29 This approach would consume both the projected surplus of WPu and the projected surplus of separated civilian plutonium, without predetermining fuel-cycle choices for the period after the current stocks of separated plutonium are consumed.
From page 158...
... The international controversy provoked by the recent shipment of 1.7 tons of reactor-grade plutonium oxide from France to Japan suggests the political difficulties that would be faced by the much larger shipments of weapons-grade plutonium required for the plutonium disposition mission. To displace civilian plutonium to be used in Europe with Russian excess WPu, however, would require only overland transportation, which is less controversial than recent wellpublicized shipments by sea have been.
From page 159...
... MOX fabricators could be expected to charge at least the cost of operations, and possibly the full commercial rate for MOX fabrication. In the variant involving a deferral of reprocessing contracts, the reprocessors whose contracts would be delayed or canceled would probably also require compensation perhaps by means of continued payments on the existing contracts (since those who were to receive plutonium would still be receiving plutonium without reprocessing)
From page 160...
... This approach would appear to have little value, however, since there is ample capacity to burn the MOX fuel to full discharge burnups. Employing the spiking option in this approach would shift the burden of the resulting reduction in capacity factor to the West Europeans or Japanese, presumably requiring additional compensation.
From page 161...
... are sodium-cooled systems, fueled with HEU or plutonium fuels, typically with an enrichment of 2040 percent rather than the few percent used in LWRs. There are nine such reactors in the world.
From page 162...
... Thus, the capability to accept MOX fuel assemblies is already a feature of the LMR concept. LMRs operating in the once-through mode instead of the recycle mode can, therefore, convert separated WPu into spent fuel.
From page 163...
... In addition, FFTF produces no electricity, and hence would produce no revenue to offset the substantial costs of MOX fabrication and reactor operation. FFTF is located on the same site as the incomplete FMEF MOX fabrication facility described in the first section of this chapter.
From page 164...
... WPu over a 25-year period, if it operated with much higher availability than it has in the past. France also has sufficient MOX fuel fabrication capacity to support use of Superphenix for this mission.
From page 165...
... The fuel fabrication facility for U.S. naval reactor fuel is being decommissioned because fuel is now available to support fabrication of cores through about 2001.
From page 166...
... nuclear plants are being developed in the United States and other countries to meet future baseload electric generation capacity needs. One or more ALWRs could be built for the plutonium disposition mission, although in general this option would appear to have higher initial capital costs and longer time-lines than the use of existing or partly
From page 167...
... The fuel and fuel reloading systems are essentially identical to those in the present plants, since experience with LWR fuel has been quite favorable. The ABWR and the System-80+ were designed to be able to utilize a full-MOX core.
From page 168...
... PIUS utilizes passive safety features to a much greater degree, involving the power generation functions as well as the emergency cooling functions. This system is at an early stage of development and has limited funding, so that the time horizon for deployment is estimated to be 2010 and later.
From page 169...
... Even if high national priority were given to building them, they would not become available in less than 10 years. The delay in potential initial fuel-loading date in that case would be less than 10 years, however, because even existing reactors would need an adequately sized MOX fuel-assembly fabrication capability to be made available, and a lengthy approval and licensing process would be involved.
From page 170...
... NRC or Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board approval of the MOX fuel fabrication facility will also be a challenge. Earlier regulatory reviews of reactor-grade plutonium recycle in Lams, such as the Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed Oxide fuel (GESMO)
From page 171...
... All of these reactors are inherently designed to utilize plutonium fuels and thus are obvious candidates for plutonium disposition. Three utilize the current MOX fuel, and one is based on a metal alloy of uranium, plutonium, and zirconium.
From page 172...
... Department of Energy, and is based on the metal-alloy fuel pin design being developed by Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois.35 In 1994, government support for development of this reactor concept was canceled, but it could be restarted if this concept were chosen as a plutonium disposition option or a future electricity source. The overall concept, called the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR)
From page 173...
... Construction of a full-size prototype reactor co-located with a reprocessing and fabrication facility was planned if the demonstration tests were successfully concluded and after completion of preliminary and final design. The West European design, known as the European Fast Reactor (EFR)
From page 174...
... Construction on two of these plants started in the 1980s, but has been stopped for several years because of lack of funds. The BN-800 is an important special case of follow-on LMRs, because use of plutonium fuel in these reactors is MlNATOM's preferred option for disposition of both excess WPu and civilian separated plutonium (now building up in storage as a result of continued reprocessing at the Mayak site)
From page 175...
... · Adding a new emergency cooling system involving auxiliary sodium-air heat exchangers connected in parallel with the steam generators in each secondary circuit. This system provides for emergency residual heat removal during accidents initiated by the loss of power supplied to the reactor subsystems or the loss of feedwater (for example, in the case of a rupture in the water-steam equipment or piping)
From page 176...
... Reactor Throughput, Once-Through Fuel Cycle As described in the above section "Current-Generation Liquid-Metal Reactors," the ALMR capacity necessary to implement the once-through spent fuel option would be about 2 GWe to process a combined U.S./former Soviet Union total of 100 tons of WPu over 25 years. The precise capacity necessary would depend mainly on the reactor design and on the degree of fuel burnup necessary to achieve the desired level of proliferation resistance.
From page 177...
... Fuel Fabrication Given the long schedules for providing ALMR reactor capacity, the availability of fuel fabrication capacity would probably not be a limiting factor governing the schedule for initial fuel loading in the ALMR option. As noted above, the United States already has an incomplete LMR MOX fuel assembly fabrication facility, the FMEF at Hanford, which could be completed, modified for current safeguards and environmental standards, and used to produce fuel at a rate that would support the disposition of 50 tons of U.S.
From page 178...
... In MINATOM's concept for plutonium disposition, the plutonium in the BN-800 spent fuel would ultimately be reprocessed and reused. Thus, while the WPu would initially be embedded in highly radioactive spent fuel (as in other spent fuel options)
From page 179...
... Other Issues -I- - - A The U.S. decision to cancel government support for the IFR program was based in part on a desire to send a signal that the United States did not support a near-term transition to the plutonium fuel cycle for which fast reactors were designed.
From page 180...
... LightWater Reactors," after the initial period of reactor burning in an elimination option, the stock of plutonium would eventually be reduced to the point where it would no longer be sufficient to maintain criticality in the reactor. The remaining inventory would then have to be burned down exponentially by adding additional fissile material to maintain criticality in the reactor.
From page 181...
... The kernel contains enriched uranium in the commercial design. For the plutonium disposition program, it would contain a mixture of plutonium oxides corresponding to 1.61 oxygen atoms for each plutonium atom.
From page 182...
... The commercial reactor is labeled GT-MHR and the plutonium disposition reactor proposed in Phase II of DOE's study is labeled PC-MHR (plutoniumconsumption modular helium reactor)
From page 183...
... Model development to predict plutonium filer performance during normal and off-normal reactor service conditions. Plutonium fuel irradiation performance and fission product behavior testing to validate fuel design, qualify fuel fabrication capability, and provide data for validation of fuel performance/fission product transport design methods.
From page 184...
... Basic problems with the MHR include getting the Finding for a new reactor (a problem common for any of the basic reactor approaches) ; developing and testing a new plutonium fuel; redesigning the core for higher burnup, in particular, if the fuel shuffling approach is to be used; and building and licensing a plutonium fuel fabrication facility.
From page 185...
... LLNL estimates it would take 10-15 years for deployment of a plutonium burner, based on the commercial variant using plutonium-uranium fuel, and 1520 years for the plutonium fuel variants. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory estimates 10-20 years for an MHTGR deployment after decision.
From page 186...
... The fuel form itself provides a barrier against ready access to weapon-usable plutonium. Once the plutonium has been placed in the kernel of the MHR fuel pellets, the silicon carbide coating makes recovery of the plutonium more difficult 43 USDOE (1993)
From page 187...
... 45 Ten years after discharge, the gamma dose one meter from the surface of a 1 00-kg MHTGR WPu fuel block that had been irradiated to 580,000 MWd/MTHM would be about 180 rem/hr, compared to about 940 rem/hr 1 meter from the surface of a 660-kg PWR WPu-MOX fuel assembly that had been irradiated to 40,000 MWd/MTHM (see Table 6-5)
From page 188...
... DOE concluded in Phase I of its Plutonium Disposition Study that, of the reactor options examined, only the HTGR did not produce a positive net value over its life cycle, using DOE's economic assumptions (USDOE 1993, Vol.
From page 189...
... 2-335~. DOE stresses, however, that the HTGR waste volumes are expected to be much greater than for the other plutonium disposition concepts.
From page 190...
... The reactor development effort was shifted to a commercial power design in 1956, and to a breeder program in 1960 (McPherson 1985~. In the early 1950s, the liquid-fUel reactor design envisioned uranium fuel dissolved in a molten salt.
From page 191...
... development has such wide margins that any number or even range is meaningless." Reprocessing in the MSR concept is part of the integral fuel management. A fuel loop would carry a portion of the fuel continuously through a reprocessing station, where fission products would be removed and the actinides and salt would be returned to the reactor.
From page 192...
... The PBR fuel particles have a central graphite kernel that, in the version under development, contains uranium carbide. The plutonium burner would have a kernel of a graphite matrix with PuC2, a graphite layer, and an outer coating of pyrolytic graphite.
From page 193...
... The design also has been proposed as a means of transmuting actinides and long-lived fission products from LWR spent fuel. In that case, target elements containing fission products and minor actinides would be introduced along with fuel elements.
From page 194...
... Extrapolation from the uranium fuel fabrication technology to plutonium is not warranted. Shortening of the hot frit with cycling, which can lead to fracture and loss of fuel pellets.
From page 195...
... Given the early stage of development, and the uniqueness of the concept, developing and deploying a PER for WPu disposition would probably be significantly more expensive than developing and deploying any of the concepts already well into the development cycle. A DEDICATED PLUTONIUM-BURNER REACTOR To ensure that the full range of possibilities was appropriately explored, the panel considered what a dedicated plutonium disposition reactor designed for no other purpose would look like.
From page 196...
... Stainless steel cladding is an alternative proposal that would also have relatively low cost. All told, the capital cost of such a reactor would be expected to be hundreds of millions of dollars less perhaps more than a billion less than that of a typical LWR, and operations costs would also be expected to be lessor But since this reduction in cost would come with the sacrifice of many billions of dollars in revenue that an electricity-producing reactor would provide, it appears extremely unlikely that the net discounted present cost of developing, licensing, building, and operating such a system for plutonium disposition would be competitive with the costs of using MOX in existing or new LWRs.
From page 197...
... The accelerator would act, in effect, as a negative control rod: shutting off the accelerator would, if everything worked as intended, bring the reactor below criticality and shut down the reaction. This could be done more rapidly than mechanical control rods can be inserted in an ordinary reactor, which advocates argue would lead to improved safety particularly in the case of plutonium fuels, with their smaller delayed-neutron fraction.
From page 198...
... As argued elsewhere in this report, incurring substantial additional delays, costs, or risks to pursue the elimination option for WPu should only be considered if the much larger global stocks of plutonium in the civilian cycle are also to be consumed.53 In a number of the proposed ABC approaches involving reprocessing, both actinides and long-lived fission products would be separated and recycled. Excess neutrons, either from the subcritical reactor itself or from a separate accelerator system, could be used to transmute the long-lived fission products (particularly technetium-99 and iodine-129)
From page 199...
... approaches, which advocates claimed could minimize or eliminate long-lived wastes by reprocessing and recycling the actinides and long-lived fission products. In the no-reprocessing approach, there would still be significant quantities of plutonium in the waste.
From page 200...
... Still, the required moltensalt processing would pose substantial challenges, and the problem of enriching intensely radioactive cesium isotopes which has never before been done on the required scale would remain. Because the plutonium would not be separated from the minor actinides and long-lived fission products in this reprocessing approach, the risk of plutonium theft or covert diversion would be substantially lower than in reprocessing concepts in which the plutonium is fully separated an advantage that ABC shares, at.
From page 201...
... The Reactors The proposed fluid fuel subcritical reactors are based on immature technology that still faces major challenges. The reactor technology is based on the much smaller (8-MWt compared to 500-MWt)
From page 202...
... Systems will be needed to ensure adequate cooling in the event of heat-exchanger failure. Design for such an accident would require means for dumping the contents of the reactor into a volume that maintains the fuel in a subcritical geometry, prevents the intensely radioactive fission products from escaping or otherwise posing a safety hazard, and provides reliable, effective means for removing hundreds of thermal megawatts of fission product decay heat.
From page 203...
... The Reprocessing The reprocessing involved in a molten-salt system, particularly one designed to transmute long-lived fission products as well as actinides, would be quite different from the aqueous reprocessing used around the world today. There is no base of experience available comparable to the experience with aqueous reprocessing.
From page 204...
... ES&H impacts of ABC are claimed to be low. ABC proponents point in particular to the hoped-for nearly complete elimination of long-lived species that must be disposed of in geologic repositories, which would reduce the potential ES&H impacts of repository disposal.
From page 205...
... Accelerator-based conversion might be of use after the WPu problem has been transformed into a small part of the civilian plutonium stock. Only if that large global stockpile were to be transmuted by ABC systems would it make sense to commit the WPu to treatment by accelerator-based conversion.
From page 206...
... ABB-CE 1994: ABB-CE Combustion Engineering. DOE Plutonium Disposition Study: Analysis of Existing ABB-CE Light Water Reactors For The Disposition of Weapons-Grade Plutonium.
From page 207...
... "Excess Plutonium Disposition: Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (MHTGR) ." Draft Report, prepared for the Fission Working Group of the DOE Plutonium Dispositions Task Force, Rev.
From page 208...
... , 1992. GE 1994: Study of Plutonium Disposition Using Existing GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactors.
From page 209...
... Weapons-Grade Plutonium Dispositioning, Vol. 4: Plutonium Dispositioning in Light Water Reactors.
From page 210...
... "MOX in France: Domestic Programme and MELOX Plant." Paper presented at NATO Advanced Research Workshop on "Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) Exploitation and Destruction in Power Reactors," Obninsk, Russia, October 16-19, 1994.
From page 211...
... Sauerbrun. "Cost and Schedule Estimates for Plutonium Burner Based on Comparative Cost Analysis Method." Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, April 21, 1993.
From page 212...
... USDOE 1993: U.S. Department of Energy Plutonium Disposition Study, Technical Review Committee Report, Vol.
From page 213...
... Yamano 1994: Tomohiro Yamano. "Japanese Nuclear Fuel Cycle Plutonium Utilization Policy." Paper presented at NATO Advanced Research Workshop on "Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX)


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