Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium Reactor-Related Options (1995) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
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From page 1... ...
The work of this panel, which supported the parent committee and was reflected in the committee's report, has been confined to disposition of WPu beyond interim storage and, more specifically, to measures that involve irradiation of the plutonium in nuclear reactors or its immobilization with reactor wastes. The primary motivation of the U.S.
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From page 2... ...
While the direct risks are significantly greater in the former Soviet Union, under current economic and political circumstances, than in the United States, the indirect risks apply equally to both countries. To reduce the risks in both categories, the two countries should proceed expeditiously, and more or less in parallel, with programs of WPu disposition that move beyond the status quoguarded interim storage of plutonium "pits" in the form in which they emerge from weapon dismantlement-to make it significantly more difficult for this plutonium to be reused in weapons by the original possessor state or by others.
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From page 3... ...
policy, the ultimate fate of either of these waste fonns is expected to be a geologic repository. Our conclusion that these two options are the most attractive ones in our purview does not depend, however, on emplacement of the waste forms in a particular repository or by a particular time, or ' When currently planned arms reductions are complete, the United States and Russia are each expected to have approximately 50 metric tons (MT)
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From page 4... ...
Some of the advanced nuclear technologies considered and rejected by the panel for the WPu disposition mission in the decades immediately ahead might be appropriate for a later campaign to move beyond the spent fuel standard for military and civilian plutonium alike, if society decides to do that, and continuing study of such possibilities at the conceptual level is certainly warranted. The choices eventually made about this will be tightly intertwined with society's choices about how much of its energy will come from nuclear sources and with what technologies this nuclear energy will be provided; these are important
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From page 5... ...
If it were decided instead to build a new MOX fabrication facility at a government site from scratch perhaps with a capacity of 100 metric tons of heavy metal or 3.0~.8 metric tons of WPu per year fabrication of WPu-MOX fuel in the United States might, optimistically, begin as soon as 2003, and 50 metric tons of WPu could be fabricated thereafter in 7-17 years of operation. Most if not all of the 109 commercial LWRs operating in the United States in 1994 would be capable, without significant modification, of operating with at least one-third WPu-MOX fuel in their cores.
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From page 6... ...
Given twice the WPu-MOX output from a new plant that started in 2003, four reactors with these specifications could finish this job by about 2016. Alternatively, if a WPu loading of 6.8-percent plutonium in heavy metal in a 100-percent MOX core passed safety review, two 1,200-MWe-class PWRs using the output of FMEF could load 50 metric tons of WPu in 15 years, finishing around 2016.
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From page 7... ...
These reactors appear to be capable of using 100-percent MOX fuel without physical modification. Given favorable regulatory review and Canadian interest in participating in nuclear anus reductions in this way, it would be possible for two currently operating CANDU reactors of 769 MWe each to process 50 metric tons of WPu into spent fuel somewhat less radioactive than that from U.S.
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From page 8... ...
It is to be used to vitrify the military high-level waste now stored at that location, which is roughly comparable in quantity to that at Savannah River. By virtue of its later time schedule, the Hanford facility might be more readily and economically modifiable than the DWPF to accommodate WPu in the vitri third MOX fuel, 4.0-percent plutonium in heavy metal, average burnup of 40 megawatt-days per kilogram heavy metal, and 75-percent capacity factor, five VVER-1000 reactors would need just over 30 years to load 50 metric tons of surplus WPu.
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From page 9... ...
vitrification facilities. Russian authorities, however, have so far strongly resisted approaches to WPu disposition that would "throw away" the plutonium without generating any electricity from it, irrespective of arguments that electricity generation with WPu is costlier than with LEU.
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From page 10... ...
By comparison, a MOX fuel assembly from a Westinghouse PWR would have a mass of about 660 kg, would contain about 18. kg of plutonium after irradiation to 40 megawatt-days per kilogram of heavy metal (assuming initial .WPu content of 4.0 percent of heavy metal)
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From page 11... ...
Although the central estimates in all cases considered correspond to net costs, the panel's judgmental 70-percent confidence intervals include a possibility of profits from WPu disposition in some of the cases in which reactors that would not otherwise operate are completed or built from scratch for the purpose of WPu disposition and use MOX fuel from FMEF. A profit from plutonium disposition would only occur, however, if the fabrication of MOX fuel were significantly cheaper than now appears likely (compared to fabrication of equivalent LEU fuel)
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From page 12... ...
The preeminence of these security dangers, however, should not obscure the need for careful attention to the ES&H risks posed by the WPu under the different possible options for its disposition. The panel regards it as very important that the governments involved express in the strongest terms their commitment to respect reasonable ES&H constraints in their WPu disposition programs, and that they demonstrate this commitment by promulgating promptly an appropriate set of ES&H criteria for the WPu disposition process and by putting in place whatever mechanisms and resources are required to give confidence that those criteria will be met.
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From page 13... ...
While there are differences in detail in the ES&H challenges and risks posed by the two options-e.g., a somewhat more complicated set of plutoniumhandling operations for the reactor options than for the vitrification option, and a greater relative increase in plutonium content of the final waste form for the vitrification option than for the reactor options these differences do not consistently favor one class of options or the other, and none is large enough in relative or absolute terms to justify choosing one class of options over the other. ES&H issues that will need further attention in the next phase of study of these options include: developing and testing the systems to ensure adequate safety against criticality accidents in the melter for the vitrification option; confirming the conditions under which full-MOX cores can be used without adverse impacts on safety in reactors of currently operating commercial types; and determining the conditions that will provide for adequate assurance against longterm criticality in geologic repositories containing either spent fuel or glass logs from plutonium disposition operations.
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From page 14... ...
In connection with the current-reactor/spent-fuel option, work should be started to seek out specific reactors and MOX fabrication options that would minimize multiple plutonium transportation steps so as to reduce this aspect of security risk, to identify locations that are most amenable to public acceptance, and to ascertain the willingness of the plant owners to participate and the conditions they would impose. Detailed engineering studies should be completed and licensing applications submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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From page 15... ...
Full project authorization for one of the options would not be granted until the EIS is completed and approved. Working with Russia The fundamental objective of the WPu disposition program will not be achieved unless the Russians carry out a disposition program in parallel, on a similar time scale, and adhering to disposition standards equivalent to those of the United States.
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From page 16... ...
REFERENCES NAS 1994: National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium.
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