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Protecting Nuclear Weapons Material in Russia (1999) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Pages 1-6

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From page 1...
... is required, with the quantity depending on the composition of the material, type of weapon, and sophistication of the design. Russia is estimated to have approximately 675 metric tons of such material outside nuclear weapons (75 metric tons of plutonium and 600 metric tons of HEU)
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From page 2...
... In short, despite the progress, there is much that remains to be done. Given the increased threats to direct-use material in Russia, the demonstrated capability of the DOE programs to reduce the vulnerability of this material, and the improved understanding of the time and costs associated with installing MPC&A systems, continued DOE involvement in strengthening MPC&A systems in Russia should be a high-priority national security imperative for the United States for at least a decade.
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From page 3...
... program must end eventually, and the perpetuation of the systems must be a Russian responsibility. Therefore, it is imperative to nurture Russian "ownership" of the technical approaches that are pursued, to encourage increased reliance on Russian specialists to lead MPC&A efforts, and to develop improved Russian capabilities to provide MPC&A equipment and services.
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From page 4...
... expenditures, to reduce redundancy while ensuring adequate oversight, and to provide additional work incentives that will attract highly qualified specialists from the United States and Russia to participate in the program. This report contains many recommendation to address these and related issues.
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From page 5...
... The division should recognize the lead role of headquarters in intergovernmental negotiations, formulation of general policy guidance, determination of priorities among sites, arid financial oversight. It should recognize the role of the laboratories in providing advice to headquarters on the policy aspects of the program, in making technical decisions in accordance with headquarters' policy guidance and budgetary allocations, and in providing specialists who are responsible for the development and implementation of MPC&A upgrades.
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From page 6...
... 2. While these figures are commonly cited as the amounts in the former Soviet Union, almost all of this material is in Russia.
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Key Terms

  • russian specialists
  • doe programs
  • metric tons
  • russian institutions
  • economic conditions

  • materials accountancy
  • guard forces
  • policy guidance
  • russian institutes
  • severely affected

  • russian government
  • final goal
  • adequate russian
  • encouraging russian
  • consolidate storage

  • forces assigned
  • adequate oversight
  • six locations
  • pay salaries
  • recent decline

  • central storage
  • russian authorities
  • indecision concerning
  • russian economy
  • program priorities

  • continued doe
  • nurture russian
  • certification requirements
  • reduce redundancy
  • inadequate protection


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