Protecting Nuclear Weapons Material in Russia (1999) / Chapter Skim
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1 Importance of Modern MPC&A Systems in Russia
1 Importance of Modern MPC&A Systems in Russia
Pages 7-16
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From page 7... ...
For more information on estimates of Russian stocks of HEU and Pu, see David Albright, Frans Berkout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
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From page 8... ...
The civilian portion of the nuclear complex also was under special security arrangements, although not as exacting as security in the military portion.7 The Soviets maintained primitive accounting systems for d~rect-use material at each facility, relying primarily on handwritten documentation and only occasionally on computer-based records. The documentation was not always 4 The Department of Defense (DOD)
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From page 9... ...
Krasnoyarsk45/Zelenogorsk, Uranium Isotope Separation Plant 5. Sverdlovsk44/Novouralsk, Urals Electrochemical Integrated Plant Nuclear Weapons Complex 6.
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From page 10... ...
MPC&A activities at many institutes suffered very directly as reliable guards and other key security personnel with uncertain paychecks were recruited by private security firms, and the support of activities that did not generate income, such as MPC&A, was given low priority. At the beginning of 1998, DOE highlighted a number of MPC&A deficiencies that were attributed both to the lingering Soviet legacy and to economic difficulties: lack of unified physical protection standards and inadequate defenses of buildings and facilities within site-perimeter fences; lack of portal monitors to detect Missile materials leaving or entering a site; inadequate central alarm stations and inadequate alarm assessment and display capabilities; inadequate protection of guards from small-arms fire and inadequate guard force communications; lack of material accounting procedures that can detect and localize nuclear material losses; inadequate measurements of waste, scrap, and hold-up nuclear materials during processing and Inadequate accounting of transfers of nuclear materials between facilities; antiquated tamper-~ndicat~ng devices (seals)
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From page 11... ...
Both Russian and Western investors took steps to withdraw considerable amounts of money from the economy, and foreign assistance agencies under the leadership of the International Monetary Fund-reconsidered the viability of their lending and grant programs in Russia. For individual Russians, this economic chaos resulted almost immediately in extended delays in receiving paychecks, a significant decline in purchasing power of paychecks when received, and losses and devaluations of personal savings.
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From page 12... ...
Material control systems should prevent unauthorized movement of materials and allow for the prompt detection of the theft or diversion of material. Such systems may include portal monitors and other devices to control egress from storage sites; authorized flow paws, storage locations, and secure containers for material; and seals and identification codes Mat make it possible to verify readily Me location and condition of material.
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From page 13... ...
Response (communications, X interruption, neutralization) Response team Entry-and-exit control (badges, biometrics, nuclear material detectors, metal detectors, explosive detectors)
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From page 14... ...
In a 1995 joint statement, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reaffirmed the commitments of the two governments to cooperation in MPC&A, and expanded cooperation followed. Since that time, there have been many U.S.-Russian meetings at the presidential, vice-presidential, and ministerial levels to confirm previous understandings, reach new agreements for specific activities, and reduce impediments to cooperation.
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From page 15... ...
From the outset, He stated objective of He DOE program has been "to enhance, Trough Russian-U.S. technical cooperation, the effectiveness of MPC&A in Russian nuclear facilities Hat process or store HEU or plutonium." The long-term goal is for Russia to support He continued operation of upgraded MPC&A systems at the national and site levels in order to ensure He security of all weapons-usable material within its borders.~7 DOE initially utilized both horizontal and vertical approaches to address He problems at specific sites.
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From page 16... ...
Other programs are the Nuclear Cities Initiative (to encourage commercial activities in closed cities) , the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (to provide appropriate civilian-oriented employment opportunities for former weapons scientists)
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