Improving Civilian Medical Response to Chemical or Biological Terrorist Incidents Interim Report on Current Capabilities (1998) / Chapter Skim
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Pages 9-14
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From page 9... ...
Scattered and smaller-scale incidents occurred previously (e.g., mercury poisoning of Israeli citrus in 197S, the Tylenol-cyanide poisoning of 1982 that led to current "tamper-proof' packaging, and the Salmonella poisonings used by the Rajneesh cult in Oregon in 1984 to keep voters from the polls) , but a number of more recent incidents besides the Tokyo attack suggest that terrorists in the United States and abroad may be finding chemical and biological weapons increasingly attractive.
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The Tokyo attack, which may have been initiated prematurely because of wel~justified suspicion that Japanese police were about to launch a preemptive strike, employed a very crude delivery system; otherwise, the number of casualties might have been far higher. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND The United States government, while continuing to pursue the goal of preventing other countries from acquiring chemical and biological weapons, has recognized the need to address possible use of these agents by individuals or groups unlikely to be deterred by threats of economic sanctions or massive retaliation.
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From page 11... ...
HHS's experience planning and preparing for possible terrorist actions aimed at the ~996 Atlanta Olympic Games and other events revealed that traditional military approaches to battlefield detection of chemical and biological weapons and the protection and treatment of young, healthy soldiers under relatively isolated and controlled circumstances are not necessarily suitable or easily adapted for use by civilian health providers dealing with a heterogeneous population of potential casualties in an urban environment. The importance to terrorists of psychological impact, which may be significant even when the number of casualties is very low, also suggests that a different approach from that of the military may be necessary.
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From page 12... ...
ASSUMPTIONS AND PARAMETERS OF THIS REPORT This interim report focuses on current civilian capabilities and makes recommendations for action without evaluation of ongoing and planned research and development, which will be addressed by the committee in the coming months and included in the final report. This focus was selected not only to provide a baseline against which to evaluate the utility ot technology and R&D programs, but also because the committee recognizes that research and development programs are only one of a number of methods of improving civilian medical response.
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From page 13... ...
Preincident intelligence about the specific agent suspected will always be important, for it is not feasible, and perhaps not possible, to be prepared for all possible agents in all possible circumstances. For practical purposes however, the committee has taken as its starting point and as a framework within which to discuss current capabilities, a limited number of"most likely" agents: the relatively short list of chemical and biological agents that have constituted the core of military weapons programs, namely, nerve agents, mustard and related vesicants, cyanide, and phosgene; the infectious microorganisms causing anthrax, brucellosis, plague, Q-fever, tularemia, smallpox, viral encephalitis, and hemorrhagic fever; the bacteria-produced poisons botulinum toxin and staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB)
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