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5 Considerations and Recommendations for Implementing the Framework
Pages 82-93

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From page 82...
... In general, there is a natural tendency to focus attention on hazardous agents already known. Although it is important to characterize known 82
From page 83...
... A similar pitfall is to attend to the known or principal toxic effects of an agent while failing to give proper attention to delayed, less-pronounced or less-frequent adverse consequences, or previously unrecognized effects especially those that might arise from patterns of exposure other than those that called attention to the agent in the first place. For example, a great deal of attention has been focused on the acute toxicity of chemical warfare agents and the amounts and patterns of exposure that would lead to immediate battlefield casualties if troops were to be attacked with such agents.
From page 84...
... All of those factors suggest that an agent-by-agent approach focusing on determining acceptable exposure levels to each recognized hazardmight not, by itself, be sufficient for the need to assess risks to deployed forces. The framework proposed in this report has attempted to address this issue by devoting considerable attention to analyses of the activities, materials uses, and settings of deployment, and to the recognition of the situations under which potentially hazardous exposures might arise.
From page 85...
... A large armamentarium of analytical techniques appropriate to the various constituent tasks of risk analysis has been developed through extensive practice and ongoing debate among practitioners and the larger affected community over the last decades. Although the application and interpretation of these techniques for the military's purposes and in particular for the assessment of threats to deployed forces need to be carefully considered, this examination is best done in the context of the larger framework.
From page 86...
... By emphasizing prior planning and recognizing previously uncharacterized hazards, the framework aims at minimizing the chances that consequential risk factors are overlooked, and it provides evidence that a systematic, thorough, good-faith effort is continually made to identify, characterize, and avoid sources of threats to the health and safety of deployed forces.
From page 87...
... Only by keeping the ends and goals in mind and continually evaluating the collective effectiveness of the risk-analysis activities in meeting them will the individual component activities play their needed role in the overall program. Risk assessment should never be a process of blindly following the results of prescribed analyses; sound analysis will always require the exercise of considerable professional and expert judgment.
From page 88...
... It is important that the objectives deal with the practical difficulties that will be encountered and set out how the conflicts among objectives will be dealt with. The objectives should serve as part of a strategic plan for DOD to increase trust among the public and among military personnel that matters of health and safety from deployment activities are being forthrightly and competently addressed.
From page 89...
... Issues to be considered include the unusual degree of control the military has over the actions and exposures of its personnel; the need to call for individual troops to put life, limb, and health at risk in the interests of the military mission and the nation at large; the problems of trading off possibilities of health effects in later life with immediate risks of casualties and impacts on military mission or military capabilities; and other matters in which the equity and voluntariness of risk-bearing arise. If the risk analysis is to effectively contribute to such decisions, it will require an articulation of a doctrine on how risk trade-offs are to be considered.
From page 90...
... Frequently, the possibility of such latent effects has been poorly examined, but the lack of data should not be confused with a presumption that no effects exist. The natural tendency to regard acutely toxic agents only as potential sources of immediate casualties should be tempered by this realization.
From page 91...
... Deployment might entail simultaneous exposures to a number of hazards, and possible toxicological synergism among agents has played an important role in debates about health effects among veterans of past deployments. This is a rising issue in the arena of risk assessment generally, raised by mandates of the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act.
From page 92...
... For many hazards of interest in the assessment of risks to deployed forces, the key question for analysis is not about the health effects of a certain exposure, but about the likelihood that the events will produce that exposure. DOD should consider approaching such questions by creating scenarios describing the possible chains of events leading to exposures of troops, and then quantitatively assessing the likelihood of alternative courses of events, as further described in Chapter 4.
From page 93...
... 15. Determining Whether DOD's Objectives Are Met In considering the present proposed framework for assessing risks to the health and safety of deployed forces, DOD should review its existing activities in this area and determine the degree to which they fulfill its objectives.


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