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Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security First Report (1999) / Chapter Skim
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2 Grand Architecture
Pages 11-16

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From page 11...
... Aviation security must protect aircraft against attack from explosives, chemical agents, biological agents, and other threat items by all of these threat vectors, and possibly others. There is no perfect defense against all threats to commercial aviation, and optimizing aviation security with respect to performance, cost, and efficiency of air travel will ultimately require compromises in the selection of security equipment, procedures, and personnel.
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From page 12...
... As the responsibility for security measures becomes increasingly diffuse and more and more liability claims are being disputed, the need for an SOS framework for interpreting the viability of security systems is becoming more urgent. Although predicting the performance of an aviation security system against a terrorist event is difficult, an SOS approach makes it possible to estimate the performance range of a security system based on thorough and realistic operational testing.
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From page 13...
... Simplifying, comparing, and analyzing various TAAS configurations will require an overall SEF. Because of the variable nature of the threat and other components and the probabilistic behavior of the subsystems, the TAAS performance measures can also be described as random quantities.
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From page 14...
... FIGURE 2-3 Notional airport security configuration for international flights prior to the 1997-1998 deployment. Source: Dickey and Fuqua (1998~.
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From page 15...
... 2. A PRA of the TAAS using performance measures for actual bombing attempts would result in a very small input distribution.
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From page 16...
... The FAA should aggressively define operational performance metrics for security subsystems and for the total architecture for aviation security as a whole. The FAA should establish an action team whose principal task is the systematic collection of operational data.
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Key Terms

  • total architecture
  • security subsystems
  • security equipment
  • threat vectors
  • security measures

  • operational data
  • monte carlo
  • sos framework
  • containment equipment
  • test bombs

  • security procedures
  • checked baggage
  • canine teams
  • security enhancement
  • security technology

  • blind operational
  • simulated explosives
  • sos approach
  • security strategies
  • carlo runs

  • airport security
  • physical searches
  • technology integration
  • taas performance
  • explosive compound

  • strategic deployment
  • operational performance
  • performance characteristics
  • explosive threat
  • integration plan


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