The Embassy of the Future Recommendations for the Design of Future U.S. Embassy Buildings (1986) / Chapter Skim
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6 Design Critera for a New Generation of U.S. Embassy Buildings
6 Design Critera for a New Generation of U.S. Embassy Buildings
Pages 35-55
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From page 35... ...
State Department is poised to embark on the most ambitious and significant embassy construction program in its history. To carry out this program, the Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO)
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From page 36... ...
Early in its deliberations, the committee recognized that there can be no single or uniform set of architectural and engineering design responses to the myriad factors and requirements that are often unique in application to individual embassy projects. For this reason, the committee adopted two guiding principles for its work and for its recommendations to the State Department: The overall approach to future embassy building design, construction, and management should be governed by a continuing process of security impact analysis, in which the factors unique to each particular setting and mission are clearly identified and thereby determine the basis of design.
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From page 37... ...
For each specific embassy building, a security impact assessment can determine whether the nature of the potential threats facing a given facility may warrant the implementation of stronger security design measures. DEFINITION OF THE DESIGN THREAT The definition of the security threats confronting an embassy building in turn establishes the level of performance and protection that must be afforded by the building and the site in order to withstand such threats.
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From page 38... ...
Current State Department site selection procedures cannot respond adequately to the demands of any program, let alone those that will be imposed by implementation of the large construction effort recommended by the Inman Panel. The committee's recommendations call for improvements in these procedures; and although such improvements are directed primarily toward enhanced embassy security, they should also produce returns in overall embassy effecti~rene - .
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From page 39... ...
Moreover, existing security-related site evaluation criteria are not in balance with other important considerations: costs; appropriateness of the site to the building program; special and often overriding requirements related to the communications system's access and security; and suitability of the site with respect to representational and other goals. In response to these issues, the committee has recommended a site selection process and site evaluation criteria that are flexible and that allow the integration of the special or unique requirements that invariably arise in each embassy building case.
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From page 40... ...
In some cases, a site prescreening team is sent to the host country by FBO, followed by a final site selection team; in other cases, only one visit is made, during which site prescreening and final selection are combined. With this type of system, post personnel report on one hand that they do not have sufficient tune or resources to identify sites and to gather needed information; on the other hand, members of the site selection teams often remark that their efforts are hampered by the lack of such basic background materials as plot plans, surveys, aerial photographs, and maps.
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From page 41... ...
the proposed building program must be defined clearly; ~ plot plans, photographs, and site maps with topographical contours should be available; ~ green field lots should be staked or otherwise clearly demarcated; locally available utility information should be developed; information should be assembled on local zoning and build ing regulations; the cost of the site, its present ownership, and the condition of any existing facilities should be known; documented city and area maps should be available to show the relationship of the site to government offices and other points of likely frequent contact, to major transportation facilities, and to surrounding patterns of development and _ ~ ~ 7 ~ in cases in which future adjacent development may occur research should be conducted to determine likely future uses.* Recommendation 5: Site selection team.
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From page 42... ...
The formation of permanent site selection teams would overcome these problems and focus appropriate attention on the importance of a careful siting decision. To produce such a decision, the site selection team would review the candidate site information assembled by the assigned FBO professional at the post and administer the procedures and evaluation criteria developed by this committee.
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From page 43... ...
FBO should immediately adopt and implement a site security analysis, which should be conducted immediately after site selection and subsequently used as the basis for site planning and design · e c .eclslons. Discussion: The careful collection and analysis of site-related data are essential to informed design decision making concerning security issues.
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From page 44... ...
FBO should immediately adopt and implement security design guidelines for all major site elements on the perimeter or within the embassy grounds. Discussion: The committee recognizes that many site security design decisions will vary from site to site and will depend on such factors as the physical characteristics of the site, the prevalent offisite conditions, the design intent, and the nature and level of security threats.
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From page 45... ...
Additionally, vehicular and pedestrian site accesses, as well as employee and visitor entrances, should be separated to minimize the potential threat to each from a breach of the other. Sally port arrangements are necessary at all site entrances to control access and ensure that each entrant ~ individually inspected.
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From page 46... ...
FBO should revise the existing chancery building program guidance in accordance with the committee's detailed recommendations and the principles of functional zoning, adjacencies, and separation that are represented In Figure ~1. Discussion: The committee recommends comprehensive changes in the basic planning and design guidance given to professionals engaged in chancery building design.
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From page 48... ...
Information Service and commercial libraries, nonsecure conference areas and meeting rooms, post community service operations, and associated informational and representational functions) ; ~ separating service or industrial-type functional areas from sensitive areas and areas requiring special protective treatments (service functional areas include those that require the use or storage of hazardous materials and equipment, that otherwise represent risks of accidental fires, or that make it extremely difficult to prevent the introduction and conceahnent of incendiary or explosive, electronic, or other dangerous devices)
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From page 49... ...
Recomrr~endationl6: Separation ofhazardousoccup~ncies. All hazardous occupancies, such as heavy building maintenance activities, furniture storage, automobile repair facilities, fuel storage, and paint shops and storage, should be housed in separate fire-rated compartments.
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From page 50... ...
To increase embassy security and protect structures and occupants, program planning should group functions according to their relative security risk rather than their relative fire hazard. Architectural Ad Structural Systems The committee recognizes that treatment of the embassy building's exterior envelope represents one of the most challenging aspects of security design because so many factors and potential threats are involved.
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From page 51... ...
Future embassy buildings should be so designed and constructed that all building service equipment and distribution networks are contained in areas that are secure and that provide clear separations between those elements that are to be accessed and serviced only by cleared U.S. citizens and those that can be accessible to foreign nationals or others without suitable clearances.
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From page 52... ...
To ensure the installation of only those raceways, conduits, and other elements that are part of the building design, future embassy design and construction should permit easy and positive inspection during the building process. The connections between the building service equipment and distribution network areas, which are described above, and the embassy's general office areas are most critical.
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From page 53... ...
Because the disruption of these sources may coincide with terrorist attacks, embassies require reliable onsite emergency backups for these systems. The committee is not suggesting that embassies should not use locally available utilities and services, such as electrical power and water, where such services are available in satisfactory quality and form; but it is recommending that steps be taken to reduce the extent of the embassy's reliance on these local resources.
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From page 54... ...
Regardless of where they are located and who operates and monitors them, these systems should, to the maximum degree possible: ~ rely mainly on principles of alarm and annunciation, rather than on regular or continuous monitoring by a guard or attendant; . be provided with redundant features throughout, so that, for example, a closed-circuit television camera and monitor could be used to assess conditions in an area where a door alarm has been triggered; similarly, light alarms showing on a console or screen should be coupled with a sound alarm; ~ be designed, as fully as possible, for integration with other systems in order to eliminate multiple panels and screens and to ensure that only those items requiring attention are given prominence (for example, rather than crowding a console with devices for continuous monitoring of central equipment, it should be possible to display information only when and where conditions warrant attention)
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From page 55... ...
on Fatly] the co~lttee bebeves that the State Department must undertake specls1 efforts to upgrade the ergonomics and Talc human Motors englneerlug ad design of these control and coned workstatlons.
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