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THREE MILE ISLAND AND BHOPAL: LESSONS LEARNED AND NOT LEARNED 204 original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. is drastically reduced or eliminated. At least the nuclear industry produces a product, electricity, that is used locally, although this direct link has not noticeably improved the acceptance of nuclear power plants in the United States. In the chemical industry, even such a direct link to the local consumer is absent. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS In their U.S. operations, transnational corporations are like any other industry. They should estimate financial risks to themselves and environmental risks to society. They should be realistic, face the facts as Rickover said, and then introduce management practices and plant modifications to reduce any large risks. It is not only their responsibility to society, but it is also good financial practice. For overseas operations, these corporations should recognize the technological gaps between their knowledge and that of the countries in which they plan to operate. They should not take advantage of those gaps to reduce or dispense with any of the steps that they would take in the United States. Instead, they have a greater responsibility: where the technological base is weak, transnationals should insist on controlling design, construction, and operation. If they cannot, then the transnational corporation should not go into that country. SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS Scientists and engineers have had a large impact on the public's confusion about risks. Much of that impact has not been good. Alvin Weinberg (in this volume) quoted from a paper by Clark (1980), "Witches, Floods and Wonder Drugs." In that paper, Clark quotes Harvey Brooks and Granger Morgan. Brooks (1975) wrote, "Scientists inexperienced in the political arena, and flattered by the unaccustomed attentions of men of power, are often inveigled into stating their conclusions with a confidence not warranted by the evidence, and . . . not subject to the same sort of prompt corrective processes that they would be if confined within the scientific community." And Morgan (1978) wrote: "Good policy analysis recognizes that physical truth may be poorly or incompletely known. Its objective is to evaluate, order, and structure incomplete knowledge so as to allow decisions to be made with as complete an understanding as possible of the current state of knowledge, its limitations, and its implications." Unfortunately, many scientists and engineers do succumb, as Brooks says, and are not as careful as Morgan says they should be. These individuals should decide whether they want to be professional witnesses or advocates. Certainly, once you have analyzed the options, it is very easy to convince
